The trajectory of jihadist activity in India is shifting. High-impact attacks, such as the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam assault in Jammu and Kashmir attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba/The Resistance Front, and the November 2025 suicide bombing near Delhi’s Red Fort linked to a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) affiliated “Doctors network”, still mark the threat landscape. However, early 2026 indicates a change in direction. The pattern is moving from episodic, high-visibility violence to sustained, low-level radicalization within digital and local networks. This shift is less about large or mass fatality attacks and more about steady consolidation on the ground. Jihadist networks are more dispersed and less centralized, emphasizing gradual influence over quick action. This makes early detection, identifying responsible groups, and responding in a timely manner more difficult for the security agencies.  

Developments between January and March 2026 point to a diffuse, networked ecosystem linking local actors with transnational jihadist movements, particularly those aligned with the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Arrests in Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, New Delhi, and West Bengal, along with inputs on hybrid militant formations and digital propaganda systems, indicate a shift from hierarchical organizations to small, low-profile operational units. This brief outlines three interrelated trends shaping the trajectory of jihadist activity in India.

Digital Ecosystems and Low-Visibility Radicalization

Recent developments show that jihadist mobilization in India is increasingly rooted in digital ecosystems rather than physical networks. In early January 2026, Kerala Police arrested Muhammad Adil for allegedly recruiting youth through encrypted platforms and social media, highlighting how local actors can sustain outreach without direct organizational contact. Around the same period, multiple arrests in Assam and Tripura exposed small online-linked modules using messaging applications to coordinate and circulate propaganda.

At the structural level, Al-Qaeda-linked networks have adopted multi-server dissemination systems across jurisdictions, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Hong Kong, and Gulf states, making disruption more difficult. These efforts are supported by AI-assisted tools that enable rapid production, translation, and targeted distribution of content. This marks a shift from earlier recruitment models based on physical indoctrination or training camps, which, of course, are still in place, especially in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Current networks rely on continuous exposure to propaganda across platforms, keeping individuals engaged over time. This approach avoids large-scale attacks and instead focuses on gradual, incremental consolidation. Intelligence inputs indicate that both AQIS- and IS-linked actors are prioritizing low-profile activity to reduce detection while sustaining ideological influence.

 Cross-Border Networks and Internal Penetration

A second trend is the consolidation of an eastern corridor linking Bangladesh-based groups with networks inside India. In late December 2025, Assam Police’s Special Task Force dismantled a module linked to Imam Mahmuder Kafila(IMK), a JMB derivative aligned with AQIS. This was followed by arrests in early 2026 across Assam and Tripura, where small modules were found using encrypted platforms to coordinate and circulate propaganda.

Indian authorities arrested several Bangladeshi nationals in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal for operating clandestine networks using forged Aadhaar identities and encrypted communication channels in mid February 2026. Many were working in informal labour sectors, suggesting the use of migrant networks as cover. In Late March, 2026, Delhi Police announced the arrest of Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Shabbir Ahmed Lone near the Bangladesh border. Lone had been operating from a hideout near Dhaka and was recruiting youth for activities in Delhi, Kolkata, and Tamil Nadu. Together, these cases highlight the expansion of interstate linkages and a shift from isolated cells to more connected networks operating across regions.

At the same time, IS-linked Bengali-language propaganda, circulated through platforms such as Al-Bengal Media, continues to target audiences in Bangladesh and eastern India. These messages combine religious narratives with global grievances to sustain engagement across borders. Taken together, these developments suggest that eastern India is no longer just a transit zone. It is emerging as a space for recruitment, coordination, and logistical support. A sustained crackdown on Islamist groups in Bangladesh may further push operatives toward India’s border states, where porous boundaries and existing networks can support low-profile activity. In the near term, this may not lead to immediate attacks but could expand recruitment pipelines, safe houses, and support structures inside India.

Hybridization and Plausible Deniability 

Perhaps the most strategically significant development is the blurring of organizational boundaries among jihadist groups, seemingly with different ideologies or objectives. Intelligence assessments point to the emergence of LeT–ISKP hybrid modules in Jammu and Kashmir, structured into small, semi-autonomous cells to obscure attribution. Similarly, the so-called ‘Vijayawada Terror Module’ in Andhra Pradesh revealed that there might be a convergence of ideals between pro-IS and pro-AQIS followers. Although it’s too early to confirm true ideological and logistical alignment between the fighting Jihadi factions on the ground, this potential hybridization exemplifies a larger trend in global jihadism. Jihadist actors are increasingly sharing space, tools, and messaging while maintaining separate identities. This creates operational overlap without formal mergers. To note, earlier attempts of co-option in the Kashmir theatre had failed in the face of unrelenting counterterror operations and inherent ideological issues.

In the Indian context, this allows IS-linked actors to draw on existing cross-border logistics historically associated with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, particularly in and around Jammu and Kashmir. At the same time, local operatives often operate without clear affiliation, making it harder to distinguish between IS, AQIS, or Pakistan-backed groups such as LeT and JeM.

Such configurations are reinforced by propaganda strategies that emphasize symbolic presence over operational disclosure, including graffiti or poster campaigns, multilingual messaging, and coordinated online narratives on jihad, martyrdom, and caliphate. The strategic advantage lies in plausible deniability. Attacks can be framed as the work of decentralized IS-inspired actors, even when they are supported by established cross-border infrastructure. This would complicate both counterterrorism responses and military or diplomatic engagement. Broadly, India seems to be facing an emerging threat of synthetic jihadist entities and loose hybrid networks that defy traditional organizational categorization.

Conclusion

The developments seen between January and March 2026 do not signal an immediate increase in mass-fatality suicide or fedayeen terrorism. Instead, they indicate a fundamental shift in jihadist strategy in India. The trends suggest that India might be entering a phase of embedded jihadism, characterized by low visibility grassroot mobilization with deep-rooted ideological motives. However, the lack of audacious or spectacular bombings or gun attack incidents should not be mistaken for a decrease in threat, rather, it demonstrates a strategic shift toward resilience instead of immediate action. For Indian policymakers and security apparatus, the challenge will be to adjust counterterrorism strategies to deal with networked, transnational, and digitally connected jihadist threats that operate below traditional detection levels.

ANIMESH ROUL, Executive Director, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi

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• India, Counterterrorism, Jihad, Jaish e Muhammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, JMB